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For the better part of the past century, elected officials 
have sought ways to improve the performance of public 
sector operations, such as fire departments, libraries, health 
clinics, job training programs, elementary schools, and traffic 
safety.1 Interest in performance management has only grown 
over time, to the point today that it is nearly impossible to 
talk about government finance without also talking about 
performance. The idea of attempting to measure outcomes 
and paying for those results is compelling because of its 
simple logic. Proponents believe setting clear performance 
goals and tying funding to them will create incentives 
for public organizations to operate more efficiently and 
effectively, ultimately resulting in better delivery of public 
services. Fire departments, they reason, should not be 
funded according to the number of engines they own, but 
according to the number of fires they put out. Hospitals 
should be funded not by the number of patients admitted, 
but by the health outcomes of their patients. Schools should 
not be funded by the number of teachers they employ, but 
by each teacher’s contribution to student learning.
In recent years, advocates seeking to increase the number 
of college graduates in the United States have promoted 
the idea that states should finance their public universities 
using a performance-based model. Supporters of the 
concept believe that the $75 billion states invest in public 
higher education each year2 will not be spent efficiently 
or effectively if it is based on enrollment or other input 
measures, because colleges have little financial incentive 
to organize their operations around supporting students 
to graduation.3 When states shift to performance-based 
funding, it is hoped, colleges will adopt innovative practices 
that improve student persistence in college.4 The appeal 
of performance-based funding is “intuitive,” its proponents 
argue, “based on the logical belief that tying some funding 
dollars to results will provide an incentive to pursue those 
results.”5
However, while pay-for-performance is a compelling concept 
in theory, it has consistently failed to bear fruit in actual 
implementation, whether in the higher education context or 
in other public services. Despite the logic, research shows 
that tying financial incentives to performance measures 
rarely results in large or positive outcomes that are sustained 
over time.6
Why doesn’t it work as hoped? One of the earliest 
investigations of the topic was a 1938 book, Measuring 
Municipal Activities, by Clarence Ridley and Herbert A. 
Simon, in which they evaluated performance systems in 
police and fire departments, libraries, parks, public utilities, 
and public health organizations.7 Starting with what they 
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expected to be the easiest activity to measure—fire 
departments—the authors quickly ran into difficult questions 
about how best to measure performance. They found the 
seemingly simple task of putting out a fire was actually quite 
complicated. For example, the bulk of a fire department’s 
time and resources are not spent putting out fires; rather, it is 
in planning, practicing, and maintaining equipment in order 
to be ready for responding to a call. Once a fire occurs, some 
will be easier to put out than others depending on the size of 
the fire, type of building structure (residential, industrial, and 
so on), time of day, weather conditions, and even quality of 
a department’s equipment. Consequently, answers to basic 
questions about what counts, how it is counted, and who is 
responsible for producing an outcome become difficult to 
answer even in seemingly straightforward contexts. It may 
be easy to measure whether a fire has been extinguished, 
but the process through which that outcome was performed 
varies in complex ways.
Their fundamental conclusion was similar to what we 
continue to find today: using outcomes as a management 
tool is difficult because public services are delivered through 
complex organizations where tasks are not routine and are 
inherently difficult to define and measure. Notably, Simon 
later went on to win the Nobel Prize in Economics for 
developing the theory of bounded rationality, arguing that 
data generated by performance incentives do “not even 
remotely describe the process that human beings use for 
making decisions in complex situations.”8 Performance-
based funding regimes are most likely to work in non-
complex situations where performance is easily measured, 
tasks are simple and routine, goals are unambiguous, 
employees have direct control over the production process, 
and there are not multiple people involved in producing the 
outcome.9 In higher education, it may be easy to count the 
number of graduates, but the process of creating a college 
graduate is anything but simple.
This paper applies lessons from performance management 
literature to the field of higher education, exploring the 
assumptions behind performance-based approaches to 
financing. It summarizes research on performance-based 
funding in higher education, which has generally shown 
weak evidence of positive impact. The paper concludes 
that performance-based funding is likely to be effective in 
only limited circumstances, and that states should instead 
emphasize capacity building and equity-based funding as 
alternative policy tools for improving educational outcomes.
What Is Performance-Based Funding 
in Higher Education?
When states allocate funds to individual colleges or to 
systems, the largest budget items include faculty and 
staff salaries and benefits, and campus operations and 
maintenance. These budgets are often set based upon 
historical trends and fixed costs, resulting in an incremental 
approach to budgeting in which the prior year’s budget 
serves as the primary determinant of the current-year 
budget.10 While incremental budgeting offers a degree 
of predictability, it may not be responsive enough to the 
changing needs of various campuses. This is why many 
states also embed formula funding into their budget 
models, where appropriations are based on a number of 
metrics such as enrollment growth, credit hours taken, and 
classroom square footage. Incremental and formula funding 
are the most common ways states allocate funds to higher 
education, but the reemergence of performance-based 
funding is changing that landscape.11
For the past three decades, state spending on higher 
education has been a shrinking pie. Today, state 
appropriations per student are lower than they were in 
the 1980s since state support has failed to keep pace with 
enrollment demand. As states divest, they have pushed 
costs onto individual students and families in the form of 
higher tuition. As shown in Figure 1, public colleges now get 
more money from students’ tuition dollars than from state 
appropriations. As a result of these funding trends, there is 
greater pressure for colleges to show they are making the 
most of their scarce public support.
The trend toward greater tuition reliance and reduced 
state support does not bode well for improving college 
completion for two reasons. First, research consistently 
shows that a $1,000 increase in tuition is associated with 
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approximately 5 percent lower enrollment.12 As state support 
declines and tuition rises without being offset by additional 
financial aid, we can expect fewer students to persist 
through college. Second, colleges that have fewer resources 
also have lower graduation rates and students take longer 
to finish their degrees. State appropriations help colleges 
serve students by offering better academic support services, 
lower faculty-to-student ratios, and reducing tuition—all of 
which are shown to be effective ways to increase degree 
attainment.13 If a college does not have adequate financial 
resources to support student success, then it becomes 
even more difficult to meet performance goals. Many of 
our nation’s lower-income, working class, and racial/ethnic 
minority students are enrolled in colleges that have the 
fewest financial resources, suggesting performance-based 
funding models could exacerbate inequalities if they do not 
account for this context.
Performance-based funding has emerged in the context of 
tight state budgets as a way to encourage efficiency and to 
make colleges responsible for their own destiny: those that 
fail to perform will lose more of their funding. Performance-
based funding has developed in two distinct waves. The first 
occurred in the 1990s when eighteen states adopted early 
versions of performance-based funding. Some of these 
states (South Carolina) did away with incremental budgeting 
and used performance formulas to allocate 100 percent of 
their appropriations. Most others allocated performance 
funds as a bonus program, where colleges would compete 
for additional funds that were separate from their base 
budget. These early programs were popular with legislators, 
but were discontinued when political parties turned over 
and economic conditions weakened in the early 2000s. 
Consequently, several states discontinued their policies 
throughout the early 2000s, with only a handful keeping the 
policy in place.
FIGURE 1. PER-STUDENT TRENDS INSTATE APPROPRIATIONS AND NET TUITION REVENUE, 1980-PRESENT
 Appropriations                                 Net tuition revenue
Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, “State Higher
 Education Finance,” 2015,  http://www.sheeo.org/projects/shef-%E2%80%94-state-higher-education-finance.
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The second wave of performance-based funding began 
around 2010 when several states adopted (or readopted) 
new versions of the old policy, as shown in Figure 2.
Today, thirty-two states (see Figure 3) operate with 
performance-based funding policies for their public 
institutions of higher education. The resurgence of this policy 
is remarkable considering the history of performance-based 
funding, in which two-thirds of all states that experimented 
with the policy discontinued it at some point in time.14 The 
resurgence in recent years may suggest states have learned 
from past experiences—perhaps old efforts failed because 
of design flaws—and new models will yield more effective 
and sustainable outcomes. The old models did not prioritize 
degree completion, funds were typically small and only came 
as bonuses (rather than built into the base), performance 
metrics were either too vague or too varied, and states rarely 
rewarded intermediate success. Further, the old models 
did not differentiate across the diversity of missions and 
educational offerings.
The more recent round of performance-based reforms have 
been rebranded by advocates as “outcome-based,” and are 
supposed to be guided by seven principles, according to a 
firm providing assistance to many of the states employing 
performance-based funding:15
• Align incentives with state priorities
• Focus on completion
• Prioritize traditionally underserved students
• Hold all sectors accountable to the policy
FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF STATES CURRENTLY OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING POLICIES, 1990-PRESENT
Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, “State Higher
 Education Finance,” 2015,  http://www.sheeo.org/projects/shef-%E2%80%94-state-higher-education-finance.
The Century Foundation | tcf.org                    5
• Differentiate metrics by mission and sector
• Tie significant amounts of funding to performance
• Build funding into base budget, then phase-in
By following these principles, the advocates argue, state 
performance-based funding efforts will create the conditions 
where colleges now produce significantly more college 
graduates. By focusing attention on completions, the logic 
goes that colleges will adopt strategies for improving 
student outcomes while also “aligning institutional spending 
priorities with those of the state.”16
Recognizing the importance of a flexible approach that 
acknowledges the ways that needs vary across campuses, the 
strategies that emerge from performance-based funding will 
vary from campus to campus, depending on each college’s 
financial capacity and resources available to develop new 
programs or improve existing ones. For example, some 
campuses might use technology and predictive analytics 
to identify and reach out to students who are struggling 
academically. Other campuses might provide new ways to 
deliver development education or allocate financial aid in 
order to retain and graduate more students. The theory is 
that by being clear about the goal, the experts at the campus 
level can figure out how to get there, incentivized by the 
funding tied to the goal.
It Isn’t Working—Why Not?
Despite the compelling logic behind paying for performance 
in higher education, research comparing states that have 
and have not adopted the practice has yet to establish a 
FIGURE 3. STATES CURRENTLY OPERATING PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING
Two and four year                         Two year only                        Four year only
Source: Kevin Dougherty and Rebecca Natow, The Politics of Performance Funding for Higher Education: Origins, Discontinuations, and 
Transformations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); National Conference of State Legislatures, “Performance-Based Funding for 
Higher Education,” July 31, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/performance-funding.aspx. 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH ON EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE-BASED FUNDING
Authors* Outcome Years studied Effects on outcome
1 Shin & Milton (2004) Graduation rates 1997–01 Null
2 Volkwein & Tandberg 
(2008)
Accountability score 2000–06 Null
3 Shin (2010) Graduation rates & research funds 1997–07 Null
4 Sanford & Hunter (2011) Graduation & retention rates 1995–09 Null
5 Rabovsky (2012)  Revenues & expenditures  1998-09  Mix, mostly null
6 Radford & Rabovsky 
(2014)
Graduation rates & degrees 1993-10 Null, sometimes negative
7 Hillman, Tandberg, & 
Gross (2014)
Bachelor’s degrees 1990-10 Null
8 Tandberg & Hillman 
(2014)
Bachelor’s degrees 1990-10  Null, some + over time
9 Tandberg, Hillman & 
Barakat (2015)
Associate’s degrees 1990-10  Mix, mostly negative
10 Hillman, Tandberg, & 
Fryar (2015)
Associate’s degrees & certificates 2002-12 More short-term certificates
11 Umbricht, Fernandez & 
Ortagus (2015)
Degrees, diversity, & admissions 2003-12  Null, more selective, less 
diverse
12 Kelchen & Stedrak (2016) Revenues, expenditures, & financial aid 2003-12  More merit aid, less Pell aid
Source: Compiled by author from the studies listed in note 17
connection between the policy and improved educational 
outcomes. To date, there are twelve quantitative evaluations 
of state performance-based funding (see Table 1). There 
is remarkable consistency in the findings, all of which were 
conducted using different research techniques, spanning 
different periods of time, and examining various policy 
outcomes. Researchers typically examine how the policy 
affected graduation rates or the total number of degrees 
and certificates produced each year. These are the ultimate 
outcomes of performance-based funding, yet researchers 
have also examined intermediate outcomes like retention 
rates, selectivity, and resource allocation.
Across this body of research, the weight of evidence 
suggests states using performance-based funding do not 
out-perform other states—results are more often than not 
statistically significant. The most instructive findings come 
from case studies of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and 
Washington, all of which based their policies on the seven 
principles identified by advocates. In Indiana, universities 
have become more selective and less diverse while also not 
improving degree production. In Pennsylvania, universities 
did not produce more degrees even after operating under 
performance-based funding for nearly a decade. After 
Tennessee increased the financial incentives and redesigned 
its policy, universities did not improve their graduation or 
retention rates. And in Washington, the state’s community 
colleges responded not by producing more associate’s 
degrees but by increasing short-term certificates. Despite 
each state having goals related to improving college 
completions, their performance-based funding policies have 
not yet achieved the desired results.
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Studies that use national samples rather than state-specific 
cases arrive at similar conclusions. In most of these national 
studies, states employing performance-based funding either 
decreased their degree productivity or they simply do not 
out-perform other states. In some cases, colleges responded 
to performance-based funding by enrolling fewer low-
income students while spending more on non-needy 
students. Despite the weight of evidence pointing largely to 
null or negative effects, one study found positive effects on 
degree completions after several years of implementation. 
After about seven years, states using performance-based 
funding produced about 0.05 standard deviation more 
bachelor’s degrees than other states. While positive, this 
effect size is quite small and delayed when compared to 
other interventions that have larger and more immediate 
impacts on degree completion.
In 2015, states actually saw fewer students graduate from 
college than in previous years despite the fact that most states 
provide incentives for colleges to improve performance. 
How could this be? How could educational attainment 
actually drop when the majority of states have created 
incentives to do just the opposite? Interestingly, the findings 
presented above are consistent with other performance 
management literature, in which performance regimes have 
been characterized as a “triumph of hope over experience” 
and results often do not follow from performance incentives.18 
This is likely due to flawed assumptions embedded in the 
pay-for-performance logic.
To begin, proponents believe that traditional input-oriented 
funding models provide little to no incentive to increase 
completion. They claim colleges will underperform in the 
absence of incentives and that “public finance literature 
undergirds the idea that incentives and alignment to 
objectives matter.”19 Still others argue that “colleges and 
universities have had few financial incentives to prioritize 
student success.”20 From this perspective, states that never 
adopted performance-based funding should produce 
graduates at far lower rates than that of states using 
performance-based funding. But the evidence presented 
earlier shows that states without performance-based 
funding produced degrees on par with (and sometimes 
better than) those using performance-based funding. Even 
in the absence of explicit performance goals and financial 
incentives, colleges increased degree completions when 
provided with additional resources.
In other words, public sector organizations can indeed 
produce positive outcomes even when financial incentives 
are not present. In fact, there are many cases in which 
performance declined when high-stakes performance 
incentives were introduced into complex organizations. 
When hospitals moved toward performance pay models, 
they did not improve health outcomes for patients. Despite 
the financial incentive, surgeons became more likely to 
avoid sicker patients, have higher rates of misdiagnosis, and 
even cancel operations or extend wait times.21 In elementary 
education, where the goal was to increase test scores, 
teachers became more likely to teach to the test in response 
to high-stakes performance accountability.22 In workforce 
development, local job placement centers had the goal of 
improving employment stability but did not significantly 
improve the labor market outcomes for displaced workers 
even when the incentive system encouraged long-term 
outcomes.23
The Assumptions 
Don’t Match the Reality
For the logic of performance-based funding to result in actual 
improved outcomes, there are at least three assumptions 
that must hold true: the incentives must encourage low-
performing institutions to improve, there must be a clear 
pathway for achieving better results, and the changes must 
be sustainable. As explained below, in higher education, 
none of these assumptions hold true.
Assumption 1: Incentives encourage low-
performing institutions to improve.
One of the most common themes found in the qualitative 
evaluations of higher education performance-based funding 
is that low-resourced colleges struggle to meet performance 
goals. Consequently, they may lose funding and actually 
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have less capacity to make educational improvements. This 
funding loss can result in a performance paradox in which 
states demand performance, yet do not provide colleges 
with the resources to perform. As a result, high-performers 
may be the most likely to benefit and low-performers may 
struggle to keep pace. To the extent this occurs, it would 
only exacerbate existing inequalities in the postsecondary 
finance system.
These inequalities have emerged in other fields. For example, 
high-achieving and wealthier K–12 schools have been found 
to excel in state performance accountability systems.24 
Similarly, schools that already had high accountability 
ratings were more likely to receive funds and thus achieve 
even greater improvement.25 Examples are not limited to 
education: hospitals and health care providers that were 
already performing well were in strong financial shape 
consistently outperformed others.26 In higher education, 
it is likely that the colleges already performing well will 
have the resources necessary to respond and adapt to 
the performance regime. Those with the least resources 
may struggle to respond if they do not have the staffing, 
experience, or financial capability to adopt or implement 
new retention and completion initiatives. In order to give 
colleges an equal chance at competing for performance 
funds, it is necessary to ensure colleges are competing on 
equal footing where those with the fewest resources are not 
unfairly penalized for not having the capacity to respond. 
Even if a funding formula differentiates according to mission 
or enrollment profile, it is important to assess whether the 
institution has the necessary resources (financial, personnel, 
technological, and so on) to implement effective practices 
to improve performance.
Assumption 2: There is a clear pathway for 
achieving results.
Incentive regimes work best when tasks are routine, non-
complex, and when there is only one principal and one 
agent involved in delivering a service. In this environment, 
a manager is able to design and enforce a performance 
contract with an employee: if the employee does not 
perform, they do not get paid. This performance model has 
been found to work well in some industries, such as the classic 
example of windshield installation, where agents have direct 
and unambiguous control over the production process.27
However, in public sector organizations the tasks are 
rarely routine or non-complex, and there is rarely just one 
principal and one agent involved in delivering a service. 
Students interact with any number of administrators, faculty 
members, and peers on a daily basis, meaning that the 
production of a college graduate is a collaborative task in 
which no single person is responsible for achieving a goal 
on their own. Unlike installing a windshield, the process is 
neither automated nor under the direct and unambiguous 
control of a single person. In fact, windshield installers may 
find the external incentives to motivate their behaviors, while 
college administrators and faculty members may be more 
intrinsically motivated to perform. Two decades of research 
on public sector motivation show that high-stakes external 
pressure can actually “crowd out” intrinsic motivation, 
reducing the likelihood of performance.28 In this context, 
weak financial incentives are preferable to high-stakes 
incentives.
To complicate the task even further, the pathway from policy 
goal to policy outcome is not linear. Even straightforward 
goals are actually quite ambiguous to achieve. For 
example, getting a student to graduate from college seems 
straightforward—they simply need to accumulate enough 
credits over time and be in good academic standing to 
receive a degree. But in reality, there are a number of pitfalls 
along the way that can deter a student from completion, just 
as there are a number of people on campus (faculty member, 
staff, administrator, and so on) involved in the student’s 
ultimate success. For a performance-based funding system 
to work, it would need to isolate each individual’s unique 
contribution to the ultimate outcome. How to achieve this 
without crowding out public service motivation and in a way 
that can disentangle the value-added of one individual over 
any other is unclear and not without drawbacks.
Assumption 3: Effects will be sustained over time.
Proponents often refer to performance-based funding as a 
“game changer” that will usher a new era of success for public 
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higher education.29 However, experience from other sectors 
shows that when results occur, they are often only short-term 
and not sustained over time. The most common example 
comes from evaluations of the federal Job Corps, which 
initially showed positive impacts but the impacts declined 
over time.30 These job training and placement centers 
produced short-term employment results that did not last 
beyond eighteen months.31 Similarly, hospitals that operated 
performance-based funding policies saw short-term impacts 
that, within about five years, began to decline.32
One of the leading reasons results do not last over time 
is because the data generated from performance regimes 
may not be useful in professional practice. While there is 
some evidence that colleges are using performance data, it 
occurs in uneven ways depending on campus cultures and 
capacities.33 This means performance regimes likely will not 
change internal operations in ways that induce long-term 
change. To change these internal operations, states should 
pursue training of campus officials so they are better able 
to use data to guide decision-making. But before trying 
to change internal operations, it is important for states 
and colleges to have a good sense of what precisely is the 
problem in need of change and exactly what data is needed 
to help solve that problem.
A Way Forward
Taken together, each assumption has some degree of 
face validity that intuitively appeals to how policymakers 
think colleges and universities will respond to performance 
incentives. But in light of the research findings both inside 
and outside of higher education, there is good reason to 
be skeptical of each assumption since they may not hold 
true when it comes to increasing educational outcomes. To 
date, there is little empirical or theoretical support behind 
performance-based funding in higher education, yet states 
continue to adopt and expand their efforts even when the 
weight of evidence suggests performance-based funding 
is not well suited for improving educational outcomes. 
Fortunately, there a more promising direction states could 
adopt to achieve better results.
Colleges that have more financial capacity are in the best 
position to serve students well; in fact, funding per student 
is one of the strongest predictors of college graduation.34 
As states divest from public higher education, they shift the 
financial responsibility onto students in the form of higher 
tuition. Rather than stemming this tide, performance-based 
funding may actually reinforce this race to the bottom in that 
colleges that have the greatest capacity are those that will 
be most likely to perform well. If this occurs to a high extent, 
then financial incentives are a blunt policy instrument not 
well designed for improving college completions. Instead, 
states should focus on building the resource capacity of 
the lowest-performing colleges and then allocate funds 
according to performance-oriented needs.
A corollary to state financial aid policy may be an instructive 
way to think about performance-based funding and its 
consequences. Paying colleges according to how well they 
perform on various metrics is not dissimilar from the way 
states allocate “merit-based” financial aid based on students’ 
academic performance. While merit-based aid is politically 
popular, it is an inefficient way to allocate resources since 
it primarily benefits students who would already do well in 
college regardless of the aid. In a similar vein, performance-
based funding is likely to benefit colleges that already have 
the greatest likelihood to perform well. Instead of allocating 
scarce financial resources in this way, it would be more 
efficient and effective to target subsidies to colleges and 
universities that have the greatest financial need.35
A “need-based” funding model for colleges and universities 
would target resources to institutions serving the most 
underrepresented student populations. After all, the 
problem with college completion is not that elite or highly 
selective colleges are under-performing, but rather that 
campus resources are insufficient in many of the public 
institutions that low-income, working class, and racial/ethnic 
minority students attend. Building these schools’ capacity 
to better serve such students would be a far more effective 
and promising way to increase college completion. Some 
states using performance-based funding have incorporated 
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diversity into their funding models, but this is bound to be 
insufficient if diversity and equity is not at the forefront of 
finance reform. By prioritizing equity, rather than embedding 
it within a funding formula, states will be in a better position 
to improve educational outcomes.
Shifting away from this “merit-based” performance regime 
toward a “need-based” equity-funding system could address 
many of the shortcomings noted in this paper. By focusing 
on closing inequalities, building the service capacity of 
colleges with the fewest resources, and supporting the 
professional development of professionals involved with 
educating students, states will be more likely to improve 
the performance of their public colleges and universities. 
Experience and evidence shows that this approach would 
be a more promising strategy for improving college 
completions. After all, allocating scarce funds to colleges 
that are already performing well will only reproduce 
inequalities. Targeting scarce resources to those that have 
the greatest needs and the least current capacity will likely 
yield better results. This would usher in a new era of state 
funding that prioritizes results by prioritizing equity: a radical 
proposition in a higher education landscape that has for too 
long rewarded inequality.
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